Must all bubbles burst?
Across the financial world, record highs have appeared with remarkable frequency. Yet beneath the headlines, several markets that recently looked unstoppable are already beginning to crack.
Is this simply normal volatility—or the early stage of a much wider deflation of asset prices?
On the morning of 30 July 2026, the FTSE 100 pushed to a fresh record just short of 11,000 points. The timing was striking. Only a day earlier, Wall Street had suffered a sharp fall, with the technology-heavy Nasdaq sitting almost 9% below its June peak.
Gold, having reached approximately $5,600 an ounce in January, was trading around $4,065. Bitcoin, which touched roughly $125,000 last year, was close to $64,500.
This is not a picture of every market climbing happily up the same mountain. It is a picture of different markets standing at different points in the same psychological and monetary cycle: some reaching new peaks, some rolling over and others already deep into a correction.
That makes the question more interesting than the familiar warning that “everything is a bubble”.
What turns an expensive market into a bubble? Why do some collapse violently while others drift sideways for years? And if so many assets have been lifted by the same tide of cheap money, what happens when that tide recedes?
A record high is not a verdict
Markets are supposed to reach record highs.
Over time, successful businesses increase their earnings, economies expand and inflation raises prices in nominal terms. An equity index that never made a new high would be evidence of failure, not stability.
A record price therefore tells us where an asset is trading. It does not tell us why it is trading there.
A share can rise because its profits have grown. A house can rise because incomes, population and construction costs have increased. Gold can rise because demand has grown—or because confidence in the currency used to measure it has weakened.
A bubble is something more specific. It occurs when price becomes increasingly detached from a reasonable assessment of underlying value and depends instead upon the expectation that another buyer will pay even more tomorrow.
The warning signs tend to arrive together:
- Prices accelerate much faster than earnings, rents, incomes or other fundamentals.
- Easy credit allows buyers to take increasingly large positions.
- A compelling story begins to matter more than valuation.
- Fear of missing out replaces sober analysis.
- Scepticism is dismissed because “the old rules no longer apply”.
None of these signs proves that a crash is imminent. Bubbles can continue long after sensible observers first identify them.
Indeed, the final stage is often the most powerful because rising prices appear to prove that the optimists were right.
History’s most expensive lesson
The details change, but the structure is remarkably familiar.
Wall Street, 1929
America in the 1920s enjoyed genuine technological progress, rising productivity and the arrival of exciting new consumer industries.
It also had speculation, margin debt and a widespread belief that prosperity had entered a permanent new era.
When confidence failed, the Dow Jones Industrial Average ultimately fell 89% from its peak. It did not regain its 1929 level until 1954.
Japan, 1989
Japan’s companies were admired across the world. Its economy appeared formidable and land in Tokyo seemed almost beyond valuation.
Cheap credit and confidence drove property and share prices to extraordinary levels. The Nikkei peaked at 38,915 in December 1989. It took more than 34 years to move convincingly beyond that level.
The bubble did not merely destroy money. It consumed an enormous amount of time.
The dot-com boom, 2000
The internet was not an illusion. It transformed commerce, communication and almost every part of modern life.
The bubble lay in the prices paid and the speed at which future success was assumed.
Companies with little revenue and no profit attracted enormous valuations simply because they were attached to a revolutionary idea. From peak to trough, the Nasdaq lost approximately 78% and took around 15 years to recover its previous high.
The technology was real. The price was not.
Property and credit, 2008
The global financial crisis demonstrated why a credit-funded bubble is particularly dangerous.
Rising house prices encouraged more lending. More lending pushed house prices higher, and those higher prices provided the collateral for still more borrowing.
Once property values fell, the process reversed. Falling collateral values weakened banks, credit contracted, forced sales increased and the damage spread far beyond housing.
The technology may be real. The asset may be useful. The country may be successful. None of that guarantees that the price is sensible.
The monetary machine behind the cycle
Not every bubble is created by central banks, and interest rates are never the only influence on asset prices. Innovation, demographics, taxation, regulation and human excitement all matter.
But money is the oxygen that allows financial excess to grow.
After a recession or financial shock, central banks commonly reduce interest rates and inject liquidity to stabilise the system.
Borrowing becomes cheaper. Returns available from cash and high-quality bonds decline. Investors move further along the risk spectrum in search of income and growth.
Asset prices rise.
Higher prices make borrowers appear wealthier and their collateral more valuable, encouraging lenders to extend more credit. New borrowing creates more demand, which pushes prices higher again.
What began as an emergency policy becomes a self-reinforcing cycle of liquidity, leverage and confidence.
Eventually, something changes.
Inflation returns. Energy or supply shocks arrive. Central banks raise interest rates. Bond yields become more competitive. Loans must be refinanced at a higher cost. The next buyer can no longer borrow as much as the previous one.
At that point, the same mechanism begins to run backwards.
Prices fall, collateral weakens, lenders become cautious and leveraged investors are forced to sell. The boom created apparent stability; the reversal reveals how dependent that stability had become on continuously available money.
Bubbles do not burst merely because prices become expensive. They burst when the flow of new money required to keep them expensive begins to disappear.
Must every bubble actually burst?
Every genuine bubble must eventually end because prices cannot detach from economic reality indefinitely.
But ending does not always mean a dramatic one-day collapse.
The price correction
This is the classic crash: buyers retreat, forced sellers appear and prices fall rapidly.
Leverage makes this version more violent because investors may have to sell regardless of what they believe the asset is worth.
The time correction
Prices can remain broadly flat for years while earnings, rents or incomes slowly catch up.
The nominal loss may appear small, but investors lose time and purchasing power. Japan after 1989 is the most dramatic example.
The inflation correction
An asset can hold its headline price while inflation quietly reduces its real value.
A portfolio that remains unchanged after a decade of rising living costs has not preserved wealth simply because the number on the statement stayed the same.
The fundamental catch-up
Occasionally, businesses grow into valuations that once appeared excessive.
This is the least painful ending and the one investors always hope for. It can happen—but it requires years of exceptional delivery and leaves little room for disappointment.
So the most accurate answer is simple:
All bubbles deflate, but they do not all explode.
Why the present moment deserves attention
It would be lazy to describe every current market as a bubble.
The FTSE 100’s recent strength has been driven heavily by energy, mining, defence and banks, as well as genuine corporate earnings. That is not the same proposition as buying a profitless technology company simply because it has “AI” in its presentation.
Nevertheless, there are warning signs.
In its July 2026 Financial Stability Report, the Bank of England said that some global equity valuations had become more stretched, that gains were concentrated in a relatively narrow group of AI-related companies and that leverage in equity markets had risen significantly.
It also highlighted rapid growth in leveraged exchange-traded funds and vulnerabilities in private credit and sovereign debt markets.
The danger is not simply that one fashionable group of shares might be overpriced. It is that leverage and interconnected positions can transmit a fall from one part of the financial system into another.
An investor may sell what he can, rather than what he wants to, to meet a margin call elsewhere.
The present cycle also follows an extraordinary period of monetary support after 2008 and again during the pandemic.
Years of low or negative real interest rates encouraged governments, companies and households to borrow. Policymakers are now attempting to contain inflation without destabilising an economy and financial system built around much cheaper money.
That does not guarantee a crash.
It does mean the margin for error is unusually thin.
Gold: bubble, refuge or warning signal?
Gold must not be presented as immune from the cycle. Its recent performance proves otherwise.
After setting a record near $5,600 an ounce in January 2026, it fell by roughly 27% to around $4,065. Anyone claiming that gold only rises would have to ignore the evidence directly in front of them.
Gold is nevertheless different from a share, bond or heavily mortgaged property.
It cannot be valued using a price-to-earnings ratio because it produces no earnings. It pays no coupon, but it also has no issuer. Physical gold held outright has no maturity date and no company or government that must remain solvent for the metal itself to continue to exist.
That does not make physical gold risk-free.
Its price fluctuates, it must be bought and sold at a spread, and it requires secure storage and insurance. Gold does not remove risk; it changes the type of risk an owner holds.
A record gold price may sometimes contain speculative excess. It can also act as a barometer of confidence in currencies, government debt and monetary policy.
If the price of an asset doubles, one possibility is that the asset has become twice as valuable. Another is that the currency measuring it has become less valuable.
Often, both forces are at work.
When nearly everything appears to be rising in pounds or dollars, investors should at least consider whether part of the movement lies in the measuring stick itself.
The question investors should really ask
History is very good at identifying bubbles after they have burst and notoriously poor at identifying the precise day on which they will do so.
Attempting to sell everything at the top and buy it all back at the bottom is not a serious wealth-preservation strategy.
A more useful exercise is to test the resilience of a portfolio:
- How much of its performance depends on interest rates remaining low?
- How much leverage exists within the investments—or within the institutions holding them?
- Could the investor remain comfortable through a fall of 30%, 40% or even 50%?
- Which assets produce dependable cash flow, and which depend mainly on another buyer paying more?
- How much exposure relies on the solvency and promises of financial counterparties?
- Are apparently different investments actually being driven by the same source of liquidity?
- Is there a genuine balance between growth assets, liquid reserves and assets intended primarily to preserve purchasing power?
Diversification is not simply owning several funds with different names if they all depend on the same companies, the same credit conditions and the same willingness of investors to take risk.
The cycle has not been abolished
Booms and busts repeat because the forces behind them are not purely mathematical.
Human memory is short, incentives are immediate and the political cost of allowing a recession today is usually greater than the distant cost of encouraging excess tomorrow.
Each cycle develops its own language.
Railways, radio, Japanese property, the internet, housing, cryptocurrency and artificial intelligence have all offered stories powerful enough to make the future appear limitless.
In several cases, the underlying innovation genuinely did change the world. Investors still lost fortunes by paying a price that assumed every promise would be fulfilled.
The intelligent response is not to assume that every record high will collapse.
Nor is it to believe that governments and central banks can make asset prices rise indefinitely without consequence.
It is to understand what you own, why it has risen, what could make it fall and whether your portfolio can survive being wrong.
Gold is not an escape from volatility and it is not a substitute for every other investment. It is one way of owning a finite monetary asset that is not issued by a government or corporation.
In a financial world in which so many assets have been lifted by the same expansion of debt and liquidity, that remains a meaningful distinction.
The greatest danger is not failing to predict the exact top. It is believing that the cycle has finally been abolished.
All bubbles end. Some burst spectacularly. Some leak slowly. Some are hidden by inflation and some survive long enough for reality to catch up.
The question is not whether investors can find an asset that never falls. No such asset exists.
The real question is how much of their wealth depends on the answer to “must all bubbles burst?” being no.
Good Luck.

Matthew Jones is Co-founder and Precious Metals Analyst at Britannia Bullion. This article represents his personal analysis and opinion. It is intended for general information and does not constitute personal financial advice or a recommendation to buy or sell any asset.
Investment in physical gold is unregulated in the UK and is not protected by the FSCS or Financial Ombudsman Service. Its value can rise or fall, and ownership, custody, insurance and storage arrangements must be properly understood.